Episodic memory is identi¢ed with autonoetic consciousness, which gives rise to remembering in the sense of self-recollection in the mental re-enactment of previous events at which one was present. Autonoetic consciousness is distinguished from noetic consciousness, which gives rise to awareness of the past that is limited to feelings of familiarity or knowing. Noetic consciousness is identi¢ed not with episodic but with semantic memory, which involves general knowledge. A recently developed approach to episodic memory makes use of`¢rst-person' reports of remembering and knowing. Studies using this approach have revealed many independent variables that selectively a¡ect remembering and others that selectively a¡ect knowing. These studies can also be interpreted in terms of distinctiveness and £uency of processing. Remembering and knowing do not correspond with degrees of con¢dence in memory. Nor does remembering always control the memory response. There is evidence that remembering is selectively impaired in various populations, including not only amnesic patients and older adults but also adults with Asperger's syndrome. This ¢rst-person approach to episodic memory represents one way in which that most elusive aspect of consciousness, its subjectivity, can be investigated scienti¢cally. The two kinds of conscious experiences can be manipulated experimentally in ways that are systematic, replicable and intelligible theoretically.
It is almost thirty years since Endel Tulving introduced the concept of episodic memory and contrasted it with semantic memory (Tulving 1972) . Episodic memory corresponded roughly with autobiographical memory, i.e. with memory for personally experienced events, remembered as such. Semantic memory corresponded roughly with knowledge of the world, without any autobiographical context. Thus, I can well remember the last time I visited Paris, and having a particularly self-indulgent dinner at a famous brasserie on the left bank. But if asked what is the capital of France, I may simply say`Paris' without experiencing any personal recollections of the many times I know I have been there. Memory for the dinner is episodic. Knowledge that Paris is the capital of France is semantic, as is knowledge that I have visited Paris many times in the past.
In introducing this distinction, Tulving (1972) was making the point that up until that time the experimental study of memory had been essentially con¢ned to the study of episodic memory. Standard laboratory tasks involved presenting lists of verbal materials and then asking subjects to recall or to recognize the materials to which they had been exposed. This does not test knowledge of the materials but memory for their occurrence in a particular personal context: that of the experiment. Thus, initially, the concept of episodic memory was closely identi¢ed with certain kinds of memory tasks, in contrast with other tasks that were being introduced at that time which involved tests of general knowledge.
In Elements of episodic memory, Tulving (1983) introduced new concepts of episodic and semantic memory. Instead of being de¢ned in terms of a distinction between memory tasks, these new concepts were de¢ned in terms of memory systems. The proposal was that episodic and semantic memory corresponded with functionally distinct, though overlapping, mind^brain systems. Moreover, Tulving suggested that a de¢ning property of these mindb rain systems was the phenomenal subjective experience that accompanied retrieval from them. He proposed a distinction between two kinds of consciousness, which he termed autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness and noetic (knowing) consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness is a de¢ning property of episodic memory. It is expressed in experiences of mental time travel, as in the mental reinstatement of personal experiences of previous events at which one was present. Noetic consciousness is expressed without any such self-recollection but simply in awareness of familiarity, of knowing. In a clear departure from previous usage and from common parlance, Tulving used the term`remembering' to refer to expressions of autonoetic consciousness and the term`knowing' to refer to expressions of noetic awareness. Thus, in what follows, the words`remember' (or`remembering') and`know' (or knowing') are used in this restricted, technical sense to refer to the two subjective states of awareness. Used in this sense, I remember that particular dinner, but I know that Paris is the capital of France and that I have been there many times.
A year or two later, Tulving (1985) showed that subjects could readily understand the distinction between the two kinds of awareness and could report them, using remember and know responses. For example, he asked subjects to study a list of words which were then represented for a recognition test, randomly mixed with other unstudied words. For each test word, subjects ¢rst made a`Yes or No' decision about whether it had appeared in the study list. If the decision was`Yes', then subjects additionally responded with`remember' or with know'. A remember response meant that they could consciously recollect something they experienced at the time that word was studied. A know response meant that they could not do that, but recognized the word`on some other basis' (see Tulving 1985, p. 8) . In most subsequent research using this paradigm, that`other basis' has been de¢ned more speci¢cally. For example, subjects are often instructed that for a know response they must be con¢-dent that the test word was in the study list because it gives rise to strong feelings of familiarity in the experimental context (see . This de¢nition of knowing emphasizes feelings of familiarity that are associated with a recent but unremembered occurrence, as distinct from`just knowing' in the sense that one just knows that Paris is the capital of France. Though this phenomenological di¡erence is not unimportant, knowing in each sense is an expression of noetic rather than autonoetic consciousness (see Conway et al. 1997; Gardiner & Conway 1999) .
From a conventional point of view, recognition decisions are objective (third-person), and remember^know judgements are subjective (¢rst-person). On this view, these two successive stages in the remember^know paradigm cross the boundary between data that are open to science and data that are not. But I think this view is mistaken not only in the light of all the evidence, as I shall shortly illustrate, but even in principle. The objective accuracy of remember and know judgements can be just as readily checked as can the accuracy of the recognition decisions into which they summate. Moreover, it is possible to check that remember and know judgements have been made in a valid way by asking subjects to describe the bases of those judgements, after they have been made. Gardiner et al. (1998) described a database of descriptions of remember and know judgements elicited after the recognition test had been completed. Two such remember and know judgements were randomly selected for each of the forty-eight subjects in the experiment. The descriptions provided for remember responses always included speci¢c contextual details connected with the study-list presentation of the test word. Examples included, for the word`president',`Yesterday I associated this word with the word``minister''. Today I automatically remembered that association', and, for the word`harp',`On Friday I was in a restaurant with a harpist. I remember thinking of that yesterday.' In contrast, descriptions of know responses never included such detailed contextual information. Examples included, for the word`gun',`I just know that I knew it' and, for the word`butter£y',`It was just one of those words that rang a bell'. Such post-test checks are useful in supporting the inference that subjects are using remember and know responses according to instructions. Converging evidence for the validity of remember and know responses has also been provided by studies of source memory', e.g. by showing that subjects are able to judge with some accuracy presentation details such as relative position or spatial location for items they claim to remember but not for items they claim to know (see Perfect et al. 1996 ; see also Mather et al. 1997) .
In the ¢fteen years or so since Tulving's (1985) initial demonstration that subjects could use remember and know responses to report autonoetic and noetic awareness of memory, a great many studies have made use of the remember^know paradigm, especially in recognition memory tasks. These studies have been directed at a number of questions. The most general question concerns the extent to which remembering and knowing can be dissociated by di¡erent independent variables. More speci¢c theoretical issues include the extent to which alternative processing frameworks can account for the evidence, the relation between remembering, knowing, and con¢dence or trace strength, and the relation between remembering, knowing and conscious control of the memory task. There is also the question of how remembering and knowing might di¡er in di¡erent populations. The remainder of this review provides illustrative evidence relating to each of these issues.
SOME GENERAL EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Illustrated in table 1 are results from four di¡erent experiments. The ¢rst column of data shows the overall proportions of correct recognition scores, which are then partitioned between proportions of correct remember and know responses in the second and third columns. The experiments have been chosen to illustrate four possible kinds of relationship between remembering and knowing. Error data are not shown but do not a¡ect these relationships. The ¢rst experiment is a level-of-processing experiment (Gardiner et al. 1996, experiment 1) . In the semantic condition, when each studied word was presented, subjects had to produce a meaningful associate of the word. In the graphemic condition, when each studied word was presented subjects had to produce any two letters not present in the word. This di¡erence in level of processing had a very large e¡ect on correct recognition performance and this e¡ect occurred in remembering, not in knowing.
In the conditions shown from the next experiment, study/test modality was manipulated (Gregg & Gardiner 1994, experiment 2) . Subjects either studied words presented visually and then the words were presented visually in the recognition test, in an identical format, or subjects studied words presented visually and then the words were presented auditorially in the recognition test. Following normal study conditions, recognition performance is not usually much a¡ected by this same versus di¡erent study/test modality manipulation, as indeed we showed in other conditions in this experiment. But the data shown here were from unusual study conditions that had a perceptual focus and were intended to prevent more meaningful, elaborative encoding. The words were presented very rapidly and subjects were led to believe that the experiment was concerned with visual perception, not with memory. They were told to count the number of words in the list in which some of the letters were blurred and to report this number at the end of the list. It was emphasized that they did not have to remember the actual words, only keep track of the number. In fact, none of the words had any blurred letters in them, as subjects duly reported. Following these unusual study conditions there was quite a large e¡ect of same versus di¡erent study/test modality. This e¡ect, however, occurred in knowing, not in remembering.
The third experiment was one in which subjects studied a mixed list of words and pseudo-words, or nonwords, under usual learning conditions (Gardiner & Java 1990 , experiment 2). The words and non-words were all one syllable long and pronounceable, though they were presented visually. Here, there was very little e¡ect of the manipulation on overall recognition performance. But the manipulation did have quite a strong e¡ect on the reported states of awareness. Words gave rise to more remembering than knowing. Non-words gave rise to more knowing than remembering.
The last experiment was one in which subjects heard melodies taken from English or from Polish folk songs presented vocally, as single line melodies, without words (Gardiner & Radomski 1999) . The subjects themselves were either English or Polish and they were very familiar with the melodies from folk songs in their own culture. The melodies from the other culture were foreign to them and sounded not merely novel but rather strange. Both English and Polish subjects heard both English and Polish melodies either presented once or three times in succession before the recognition test. The scores in table 1 show the e¡ect of study trials for the melodies that were strange to the subjects, the Polish songs for the English folk, and the English songs for the Polish folk. Three study trials, compared with one, increased overall recognition substantially. But here the e¡ect occurs not only in remembering but also in knowing. Interestingly, this parallel e¡ect of increased study trials on remembering and knowing occurred only with the strange melodies. Additional study trials with subjects' own folk songs increased remembering but did not increase knowing.
Thus some independent variables a¡ect remembering but not knowing. Other independent variables a¡ect knowing and not remembering. Still others a¡ect remembering and knowing in opposite ways and some a¡ect remembering and knowing in parallel ways. Functionally, then, these two subjective states of awareness are independent in the sense that they are susceptible to this pattern of experimental manipulation.
In Tulving's (1983 Tulving's ( , 1985 theory, events have ¢rst to be registered in the semantic system before they can be registered in the episodic system; they can be stored in parallel in both systems and retrieval from both systems is independent (see Tulving 1995) . If remembering and knowing, respectively, re£ect retrieval from episodic and semantic systems this evidence clearly implies that both systems contribute to recognition memory. Just as certain autobiographical facts are known as suchöI know I have visited Paris many times without any remembrance of a particular visitöso too can study list events be known to have occurred without any remembrance of them. Indeed, under certain conditions, such as those in the experiment by Gregg & Gardiner (1994) , recognition memory may largely re£ect the semantic rather than the episodic system. Presumably, the unusual study conditions in that experiment were su¤cient to allow encoding into the semantic system but largely precluded encoding into the episodic system. Encoding into the episodic system seems to depend on the more conscious elaboration of meaning, as is also suggested by the other ¢ndings illustrated in table 1.
These ¢ndings did not, of course, stem from any strong tests of that hypothesis or, more broadly, even of the interpretation of them provided by the distinction between episodic and semantic memory. Rather, this interpretation is supported by other kinds of converging evidence, which includes evidence from amnesic patients (for a discussion of some of this evidence, see Mishkin et al. 1998; Squire & Zola 1998; Tulving & Markowitsch 1998) . It also includes evidence from recent studies of patterns of brain activity. This evidence points clearly to both temporal and spatial di¡erences in activations associated, respectively, with remembering and knowing (e.g. Curran 2000; DÏzel et al. 1997; Eldridge et al. 2000; Henson et al. 1999) .
AN ALTERNATIVE PROCESSING FRAMEWORK
At a cognitive^behavioural level, an alternative processing account of remembering and knowing has been developed by Suparna Rajaram (Rajaram 1993 (Rajaram , 1996 . This approach is complementary to the systems approach; it does not contradict it. Nor has research been much concerned in contrasting the two approaches within any given experiments. Rather, this processing account provides another framework for integrating the various ¢ndings, one that has the advantage of allowing quite speci¢c predictions about the conditions that are likely to in£uence the two states of awareness.
The initial proposal (Rajaram 1993) was that the two states of awareness mapped onto a distinction between conceptual processing and perceptual processing (see e.g. Roediger et al. 1989) . Early evidence did seem to support this possibility. Conceptual variables like level of Mantyla 1997) . The relationship between the process distinction and the states of awareness therefore now seems to be more of an orthogonal one. Rajaram (1996) revised this processing account and proposed instead that remembering depends largely on the distinctiveness of the processing, which could be more or less distinctive, either conceptually or perceptually, and that knowing depends largely on processing £uency, which could be more or less £uent, either perceptually or conceptually. By this account, a deeper level of processing leads not only to more conceptual encoding but also to more distinctive encoding. Such distinctive encoding is more di¤cult to achieve in the unusual study conditions used by Gregg & Gardiner (1994) , or for non-words compared with words, or for melodies from a foreign musical culture. Following those sorts of conditions the study list encounter is more likely to increase the £uency with which studied items are perceived in the test, and hence a¡ect knowing rather than remembering.
One of the ¢ndings that led to the distinctiveness£ uency framework had to do with recognition memory for pictorial materials, speci¢cally for line drawings of familiar everyday objects (Snodgrass & Vandervart 1980) . Picture recognition memory is a¡ected by size congruence at study and at test. If there are larger and smaller versions of the same picture, then presenting the picture in the same size at study and test leads to higher recognition than presenting the picture in di¡erent sizes at study and test. Rajaram (1996) found that this perceptual manipulation of size congruence occurred in remembering but not in knowing. Presumably, the distinctiveness of picture encoding is likely to be more fully reinstated at test when the picture at test is the same size as the picture at study.
An orthogonal view of the relationship between the states of awareness and the kind of processing, however, suggests that if encoding conditions were impoverished, hence reducing the opportunity to achieve distinctive encoding, then the same e¡ect might in£uence processing £uency. If so, the e¡ect might then occur partially, or even wholly, in knowing (compare with Gregg & Gardiner 1994) .
We investigated this possibility in an experiment that replicated Rajaram's (1996) experiment but used photographs of faces rather than pictures of everyday objects (Gardiner et al. 2001a , experiment 2). The faces were presented for study in one of two sizes, a larger or a smaller version. At test, half the faces were presented in the same larger or smaller size, and half in the alternate size. To manipulate encoding, subjects were given a levelof-processing task. For deeper processing, subjects had to rate the reliability of the person (1 very reliable; 5 very unreliable). For shallow processing, subjects had simply to report whether the face belonged to a female or to a male person. The results are shown in table 2.
The overall scores are shown in the ¢rst row of the table. These scores show clear e¡ects of level of processing and of size congruence. Recognition was higher following reliability ratings and it was higher when the faces were presented in the same size at study and at test. Reports of the states of awareness, however, reveal a more complex pattern. Following the reliability ratings, the e¡ects of size congruence occurred in remembering which replicates the results found by Rajaram (1996) . Following gender assignment, however, the e¡ects of size congruence occurred in knowing, not in remembering. Thus, in keeping with the processing framework, similar e¡ects may occur either in remembering or in knowing, depending on encoding conditions. If those conditions foster more distinctive processing, the e¡ects are likely to occur in remembering. If those conditions largely preclude more distinctive processing, the e¡ects are likely to occur in knowing.
Of course, these ¢ndings can also be accommodated within the systems framework. The e¡ects of encoding conditions may in£uence the relative ease, or di¤culty, of encoding events into the episodic system. Encoding into the episodic system may depend on the distinctiveness of the encoded event and the amount of attention paid to it.
This result has been replicated in another experiment on the size congruence e¡ect (Gardiner et al. 2001a , experiment 1), but it is not known whether similar results might be found for other kinds of e¡ect. They might be restricted to certain kinds of perceptual e¡ects. In line with that possibility, Curran & Hildebrandt (1999) showed that remembering is greatly reduced by alcohol but that a level-of-processing e¡ect did not as a result then appear in know responses. That result too suggests that the appearance of the size congruence e¡ect in know responses was not simply due to the lower level of performance in the more impoverished encoding conditions, rather than due to the qualitative nature of the encoding. Nor have lower levels of performance been shown to lead to the appearance in knowing of other e¡ects that have been found normally to occur in remembering (see e.g. Dewhurst & Anderson 1999; Gardiner & Radomski 1999) . Further evidence on this problem is clearly desirable.
But, for now, the important point is that the size congruence e¡ect itself, as distinct from its in£uence on subjective awareness, was quite una¡ected by level of processing. And this is the ¢rst demonstration that, at least under some circumstances, exactly the same e¡ect (rather than two di¡erent e¡ects, such as those illustrated 
REMEMBERING, KNOWING AND CONFIDENCE
Remembering and knowing must clearly be related to con¢dence in memory. Indeed, Tulving (1985, p. 10) had suggested that`the adaptive value of episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness lies in the heightened subjective certainty with which organisms endowed with such memory and consciousness believe, and are willing to act upon, information retrieved from memory.'
In contrast with the idea that it is subjective states of awareness that give rise to varying degrees of con¢dence in memory, it has also been suggested that the subjective states of awareness might be explained in terms of con¢-dence (Donaldson 1996 ; see also Hirshman & Master 1997; Inoue & Bellezza 1998) . On this view, remembering and knowing do not re£ect di¡erent sources of memory, but di¡erent response criteria for the same memory trace. Remember responses re£ect stricter response criteria; know responses re£ect more lenient response criteria. Using these assumptions, it is possible that remembering and knowing could be accounted for by a signal detection model that provides separate estimates of the strength of the memory trace and of response criteria.
For example, Donaldson (1996) described a metaanalysis of some eighty di¡erent experimental conditions from remember^know studies and used this database for some critical tests of a detection model. A crucial prediction for this model is that the strength of the memory trace should be the same whether estimated from only remember responses (the strict criterion) or from remember-plus-know responses (the more lenient criterion, that is, overall yes^no recognition). In a reanalysis of Donaldson's (1996) database, Gardiner & Gregg (1997) showed that, though the di¡erences were small, memory strength was consistently greater when estimated from know and remember responses than when estimated from only remember responses. Moreover, estimates of memory strength have been shown sometimes to be considerably higher when know responses are added to remember responses in individual experiments. This is the case in the conditions from the Gregg & Gardiner (1994) Gardiner & Gregg 1997; Gardiner et al. 2001a) . These tests of the model indicate that know responses do re£ect an additional source of memory.
A number of studies that have directly compared results obtained from remember and know responses with results obtained from con¢dence judgements have found di¡erent patterns of results for the two kinds of responses (e.g. Gardiner & Java 1990; Parkin & Walter 1992; Rajaram 1993) . These ¢ndings show that remember and know responses are not equivalent to con¢dence judgements. One example of this is shown in table 3. The data here are for the words and non-words in the second experiment by Gardiner & Java (1990) , together with data for the same words and non-words in a third experiment. This third experiment was identical to the second experiment in all respects except for the test instructions. Instead of being instructed for remember and know responses, subjects were instructed to give binary con¢-dence judgements,`sure' and`unsure'. With these con¢-dence judgements, the proportions of correct responses form quite a di¡erent pattern. In contrast with remember and know responses, sure and unsure judgements did not di¡er much between the words and the non-words. Notice too that the proportion of sure judgements for studied non-words was considerably higher than the proportion of remember responses.
Compared with remember and know responses, sure and unsure judgements seem to have induced more lenient response criteria, as indicated by the relatively high proportions of unsure judgements to unstudied words and non-words. But similar kinds of outcomes would be observed for know responses if subjects elected to use know responses as if they were unsure con¢dence judgements instead of reports of noetic awareness. Subjects could use know responses in this more strategic way Strack & Forster 1995) . Indeed, noetic awareness could be completely obscured if know responses were used as if they were unsure con¢dence judgements and response criteria were very lenient and subjects responded`yes' to many of the unstudied items.
Most remember^know studies have controlled for this by strongly emphasizing that know responses are not low con¢dence judgements and by discouraging guessing. In quite a few recent studies, another approach to this problem has been adopted. In addition to reporting remember and know responses, subjects are also instructed to report guesses. Guesses are de¢ned as having some other reason to believe, or suspect, that a test item was encountered in the study listösome reason other than remembering or knowing. Such reasons might include strategies based on memory for the proportions of studied to unstudied items in the test, or on memory for a particular category of items that was studied, such as names of musical instruments, rather than for the particular instances from that category that were presented.
Following Donaldson (1996) , we have recently put together another database of some eighty-six di¡erent experimental conditions from remember^know studies (Gardiner et al. 2001b ). All of these conditions included guess responses, as well as remember and know responses. None of these conditions appeared in Donaldson's (1996) database; no condition in his database included guess responses. Thus our database is completely independent of his. Also, in our database we replicated the ¢nding that memory strength was signi¢cantly greater when estimated from know and remember responses than when estimated from only remember responses. In addition, in our database, when guess responses were added to remember and know responses, the estimated strength of memory slightly but signi¢cantly decreased. The reason for this is shown in ¢gure 1, where, following Donaldson (1996) , the strength of the memory trace is estimated by the A' values plotted against the vertical axis. These A' values were here estimated separately (not cumulatively) for remember responses, for know responses and for guess responses. They indicate the extent to which each of the di¡erent kinds of responses, taken alone, re£ects memory for the studied lists. An A' estimate of 1.0 represents perfect memory; 0.5 represents chance. Along the horizontal axis, these A' estimates are shown as a function of overall yes^no recognition response criteria, moving from the most strict response criteria on the right to the most liberal response criteria on the left.
Note that not only A' estimates for remember responses but also A' estimates for know responses were consistently and appreciably above chance. Also, neither remember nor know responses were correlated with yes^no recognition response criteria. Guess responses, however, on average did not di¡er from chance and they fell away to well below chance as response criteria become more lenient. They did so because as yes^no response criteria become more lenient, there tended to be more guesses for unstudied than for studied items. Thus, there was a signi¢cant positive correlation between yes^no response criteria and guessing. Donaldson (1996) predicted, and found, just such a correlation between yes^no response criteria and knowing in his database. We found no such correlation for knowing, but instead found the correlation in guessing. The implication is that the correlation in Donaldson's (1996) database did not re£ect noetic awareness, but guessing. Thus, our results provide further evidence that the detection model does not ¢t remembering and knowing.
There are other di¤culties in an approach of this kind. These include its lack of explanatory value and the question of whether such an approach to trying to understand the subjective states of awareness measured by remember and know responses is even appropriate methodologically. It is hard to see much explanatory value in the concept of trace strength, or how an approach based on this concept could accommodate the evidence from amnesic patients and from studies of brain activation. Also, as Tulving (1985) suggested, it is surely the subjective state of awareness that gives rise to con¢dence in memory, not con¢dence that gives rise to the state of awareness. Methodologically, tests of the detection model require response criteria to be manipulated, but manipulating response criteria risks invalidating remember and know responses as measures of autonoetic and noetic awareness. The main point made here, however, is that even if it is accepted at face value, without taking such broader considerations into account, this trace strength model does not ¢t the data, except under exceptional circumstances (for more discussion, see Gardiner 2000; Gardiner & Conway 1999; Gardiner et al. 2001a ). There is a ¢nal cautionary note. Although some studies have shown dissociations between remember and know responses and con¢dence judgements (e.g. Gardiner & Java 1990) , some other studies have found evidence of convergence between these two kinds of data (e.g. Yonelinas et al. 1998) . It is possible that evidence of such convergence may simply mean that remember and know responses (particularly know responses) are being used as con¢dence judgements.
REMEMBERING, KNOWING AND CONSCIOUS CONTROL
In another approach to recognition memory, strong assumptions are made about the relation between subjective states of awareness and conscious control. This is a dual-process model that distinguishes between two independent processes: recollection and familiarity (e.g. Jacoby 1991; Mandler 1980) . It is additionally assumed that recollection is a relatively slow, e¡ortful process, depending on conscious control, and that familiarity is a relatively fast, automatic process, not dependent upon conscious control. And the processes of recollection and familiarity have also been assumed to give rise to the corresponding subjective states of awareness, as measured by remember and know responses (see e.g. Jacoby et al. 1997) .
A useful way of at least partially separating the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition memory is provided by a response deadline procedure in which subjects are trained to respond rapidly to each test item after either a short or a long response deadline. For example, Toth (1996) trained subjects to respond at one of two response deadlines. The shorter deadline was 500 ms after the presentation of the test item. The longer deadline was 1500 ms after the presentation of the test item. On the given signal to respond, subjects then had to make their yes^no recognition decision within 400 ms. The training phase involved a lexical decision task unrelated to the recognition memory experiment and it was interpolated between the presentation of the study list and the recognition test.
The argument is that at the shorter response deadline recognition will depend largely on the faster, more automatic, familiarity process. With the longer response deadline, recognition will depend more on the slower, more e¡ortful, recollection process. Using this procedure, Toth (1996) found that at the shorter but not at the longer response deadline, there was an e¡ect of same-versusdi¡erent study-test modalities, rather like the e¡ect found by Gregg & Gardiner (1994) shown in table 1. This sensitivity of the speeded recognition decisions to perceptual match at study and test supports the argument that they largely re£ected the familiarity process. Toth (1996) also found that there were level-of-processing e¡ects at the shorter, as well as at the longer, response deadlines. That level-of-processing e¡ects occurred at both deadlines suggests that familiarity, as well as recollection, is in£u-enced by conceptual processing.
In contrast with the assumed e¡ects of level of processing on the familiarity process, level-of-processing e¡ects have not generally been found in know responses (see table 1 ). Toth's (1996) ¢ndings raised the question of whether level-of-processing e¡ects might be found in know responses at shorter response deadlines. More generally, they raised the question of how shorter and longer response deadlines relate to remembering and knowing. For example, one might expect that know responses should predominate at the shorter deadline and remember responses should predominate at the longer deadline. Similarly, one might expect that remember but not know responses should increase considerably with the longer deadline. Table 4 summarizes the results from an experiment designed to test these predictions , experiment 1). The semantic study task was to rate the ease of generating an associate of each studied word. The phonemic study task was to rate the ease of generating a rhyme for each studied word. Replicating the results obtained by Toth (1996) , the overall recognition results show that there were level-of-processing e¡ects at both the shorter and the longer response deadlines. However, these level-of-processing e¡ects occurred only in remember responses, even at the shorter deadline. Know responses did not show any level-of-processing e¡ects, nor did they predominate at the shorter response deadline. In fact, both know and remember responses increased at the longer compared with the shorter deadline. As table 4 shows, there were also guess responses in this experiment, though guessing was discouraged in the test instructions in order to avoid any speed^accuracy trade-o¡. (False alarm rates were similar at each response deadline.) There was also little di¡erence between the proportions of guess responses to unstudied and studied words.
Because the two processes of recollection and familiarity are assumed to be independent, the raw proportions of know responses underestimate the familiarity process. In an`independence remember^know' model (see e.g. Jacoby et al. 1997) , the recollection process is estimated by the proportions of correct remember responses (there are usually extremely few incorrect remember responses). However, the familiarity process is given by dividing the proportion of correct know responses by 1 minus the proportion of correct remember responses. Applying this model to the data in table 4 gives familiarity estimates of 0.16 and 0.14 for the semantic and phonemic conditions at the shorter response deadline. For the longer response deadline, the corresponding familiarity estimates are 0.37 and 0.31. Thus, even with this independence rememberk now model, familiarity estimates do not show level-ofprocessing e¡ects at the shorter deadline, nor do they indicate that recognition at the shorter deadline largely re£ects the familiarity process. These ¢ndings, among others (for more discussion see Gardiner 2000; , support the conclusion that remembering and knowing do not correspond with recollection and familiarity processes as conceived in this dual-process model. Granted that the longer response deadline allows more conscious control, it then seems that knowing, as well as remembering, increases with conscious control. Conversely, granted that the shorter response deadline allows less conscious control, it then seems that remembering, as well as knowing, can occur in a relatively automatic way.
There are situations other than speeded recognition in which remembering does not seem to control the memory response. For example, there is evidence, both at a behavioural level and at the level of brain activity, of dissociations between retrieval volition and memorial awareness, i.e. between whether or not subjects consciously intended to retrieve studied words and their awareness that some of the words retrieved were studied (e.g. Java 1994; Richardson-Klavehn et al. 2000) . This evidence shows awareness of memory in incidental (or`implicit') tests, such as word-stem completion, under circumstances in which it can be shown that there was no conscious intention to retrieve words from the study list, only to retrieve the ¢rst words brought to mind by the incidental retrieval instructions and test cues (for a review, see Gardiner et al. 2001c) .
The general conclusion is that remembering should not be identi¢ed with conscious control in the way that it has been in some theoretical models.
REMEMBERING AND KNOWING IN ADULTS WITH ASPERGER'S SYNDROME
There is considerable evidence that remembering and knowing di¡er systematically in certain special populations compared with the normal population. Most of this evidence relates to amnesic patients compared with matched controls and to older adults compared with younger adults. In both amnesia and in normal ageing, remembering is substantially reduced, if not, in some cases, essentially absent (see e.g. Tulving et al. 1991) . In contrast, knowing has been found to remain relatively unimpaired in amnesia, with one or two exceptions (e.g. Knowlton & Squire 1995) , and in old age.
There is also some evidence that a reduced capability for autonoetic consciousness is characteristic of some other problems thatöunlike amnesia, or the e¡ects of normal ageingöhave not traditionally been thought of in connection with memory impairment. It has been discovered, for example, that schizophrenia is associated with a reduction in autonoetic awareness. Huron et al. (1995) found that schizophrenic patients showed impaired recognition memory in their remember responses but not in their know responses.
We have recently begun to investigate remembering and knowing in another populationöadults with Asperger's syndrome (Bowler et al. 2000b,c) . Asperger's syndrome is now regarded as part of a wider spectrum of autistic disorders. This syndrome includes problems common to the wider spectrum, such as problems in social communication, an inability to relate fully to others, and to understand fully what is required, or what is meant, in a given social situation. Its distinguishing characteristics are the lack of any evidence of impaired language function and the existence of intellectual abilities that fall within the normal range. Adults with Asperger's syndrome have also been observed to display remarkably good rote memories for highly specialized information, such as bus or train timetables.
There have been relatively few experimental studies of memory within the autistic spectrum and most of these have been of memory in children rather than in adults. For example, Boucher & Warrington (1976) found that, unlike matched controls, children with autism were unable to make much use of category relations among studied words (compared with unrelated words) to improve their recall. Bowler et al. (1997) replicated this ¢nding in adults with Asperger's syndrome. There is also some evidence of poorer source monitoring in children with autism, in that they have been found to recall more words from previously studied lists, rather than from the currently studied list, than matched controls (Bennetto et al. 1996) . However, Farrant et al. (1998) did not ¢nd evidence of poorer source monitoring when children with autism had to identify which of two experimenters had spoken the words from a study list.
In contrast with evidence of impaired free recall and source memory in individuals with autism, there is little evidence of signi¢cant memory impairment in cued recall and in recognition, at least in high-functioning individuals, including adults with Asperger's syndrome. For example, Bowler et al. (1997) found that both word-stem completion and word-stem cued recall were unimpaired in adults with Asperger's syndrome. And in two di¡erent experiments, Bowler et al. (2000b,c) found no signi¢cant impairments in recognition. The absence of any signi¢-cant impairment in recognition, however, does not necessarily mean the absence of any impairment in autonoetic awareness. A decrease in remember responses can sometimes be o¡set by an increase in know responses (see e.g. Blaxton & Theodore 1997) . Table 5 summarizes some results from the experiment by Bowler et al. (2000c, experiment 2) . The adults with Asperger's syndrome in this experiment were individually matched with subjects in a control group by age and verbal intelligence quotient (IQ). The average age of both these adults and those in a control group was about 27 (range 21^35), and their verbal IQ scores were on average about 87 (range 79^133). The experiment used a version of a converging-associates paradigm introduced by Deese (1959) and subsequently developed by Roediger & McDermott (1995) . This paradigm has been widely used to study false recall and false recognitionö`illusions' of memory for items that were not actually presented in the study list.
In our experiment, subjects studied ¢ve sets of nine words. Each set consisted of the nine next most highly associated words for three other words that were not presented. For example, one set might be`frigid, chilly, heat, weather, hot, air, shiver, arctic, frost' for the three non-presented associates`winter, ice, wet'. Words within sets were blocked at study and each set was presented in succession. In the test, the words were randomly ordered and there were true and false targets. The true targets were three words that had been presented in each of the nine associated sets. The false targets were the three nonpresented associates for each of the nine sets. Illusions of memory occur to the extent that subjects recognize the false targets. These illusions can be compellingö Roediger & McDermott (1995) showed that they tend to occur more in remember than in know responses.
Thus, the experiment was also designed to determine the extent to which adults with Asperger's syndrome are susceptible to illusions of memory. Other populations have been found to be di¡erentially susceptible. For example, there is some evidence that amnesic patients are less susceptible to memory illusions (Schacter et al. 1996) but that adults become more susceptible to them with normal ageing (Schacter et al. 1997) .
Remember and know responses were de¢ned somewhat more abstractly in this experiment as`type A' and`type B' memories (see also Bowler et al. 2000b ) and the subjects explained their remember and know responses after they made each recognition decision. This enabled the experimenter to monitor subjects' understanding and use of these responses online, throughout the test. There was no evidence from this monitoring procedure, or from the explanations given for remember and know responses, that the adults with Asperger's syndrome were using these responses any di¡erently from subjects in the control group.
First, in table 5, consider overall recognition of true targets, the associates that were actually presented. Recognition is somewhat lower in the adults with Asperger's syndrome, though not signi¢cantly so. However, they made signi¢cantly fewer remember responses, and more know responses, than did the matched control subjects, replicating results found by Bowler et al. (2000b) . Consider next false recognition of those associates that were not presented. Both groups show quite high levels of false recognition, the control group more so than the adults with Asperger's syndrome, though that di¡erence was not signi¢cant statistically either. And in contrast with veridical recognition, false recognition in each group was essentially restricted to remembering.
Additional signal detection analyses of these data, of the sort described earlier in this paper (½ 4), con¢rmed that overall A' estimates of memory strength, for both true and false targets, did not di¡er signi¢cantly between groups. They were, however, signi¢cantly higher for overall recognition (remember-plus-know responses) than for remember responses alone. Nor were there any between-group di¡erences in the corresponding estimates of response criteria.
Some conclusions from this experiment are obviously quali¢ed by the implications of the relatively small group sizes, which mean that failure to ¢nd signi¢cant di¡erences must be accepted with caution. In contrast with our results, Beversdorf et al. (2000) found that high-functioning adults with autism (the distinction between the various forms of autism spectrum disorder was not clear in this group) showed signi¢cantly less false recognition in a similar converging associates paradigm. (They found no signi¢cant between-group di¡erences in recognition of true targets.) However, in a free recall experiment Bowler et al. (2000c, experiment 1) also found no signi¢cant between-group di¡erences in the false recall of nonpresented associates, despite signi¢cantly lower recall of presented associates in the adults with Asperger's syndrome. Further evidence is needed to establish whether or not adults with Asperger's syndrome really might be less susceptible to memory illusions of this kind.
The evidence of reduced autonoetic awareness in adults with Asperger's syndrome does not su¡er from this limitation. Thus the main conclusion is that there is indeed episodic memory impairment in adults with Asperger's syndrome. In terms of the distinctiveness£ uency framework, it seems that adults with Asperger's syndrome are less likely to encode items in an elaborative, distinctive way, and hence may be more likely to rely on processing £uency in recognition memory. We are currently evaluating some hypotheses as to the reasons for this impairment, including the possibility is that it may re£ect attentional problems, both at encoding and at retrieval (Bowler et al. 2000a) . More broadly, it may be that reduced autonoetic awareness in adults with Asperger's syndrome may have consequences for their self-awareness generally, and be related to their di¤culties in goal-directed and social behaviour.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have illustrated a ¢rst-person approach to understanding episodic memory and consciousness, as exempli¢ed by the remember^know paradigm. Episodic memory is identi¢ed with autonoetic awareness, measured by remember responses. Semantic memory is identi¢ed with noetic awareness, measured by know responses. Both memory systems may contribute to performance in episodic memory tasks. I have illustrated the approach by making ¢ve main points:
(i) Remembering is readily dissociable from knowing, particularly in recognition memory.
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(ii) Remembering and knowing can also be interpreted within a distinctiveness or £uency of processing framework. (iii) Remembering and knowing do not correspond with di¡erences in con¢dence in memory or trace strength. (iv) Nor does remembering correspond with conscious control of the memory task. (v) Populations in which remembering is impaired include adults with Asperger's syndrome. At a much broader theoretical level, it is necessary to abandon the old view of consciousness and memory that distinguished only between conscious and non-conscious forms of memory (for a review, see Toth 2000) . Instead, there is a need for ¢ner distinctions within consciousness, as evidenced by the distinction between remembering and knowing. There is also a need to distinguish between these di¡erent kinds of memorial awareness and consciousness in the sense of conscious control of the task. Remembering does not control the memory response either in speeded recognition or in some incidental tests of memory.
This approach also demonstrates one way in which the subjectivity of conscious experience, long thought to be intractable to science, can be tackled scienti¢cally. Doing this depended on classifying conscious experiences into at least two di¡erent natural kinds, autonoetic and noetic, that could then be manipulated experimentally. It also depended on treating these natural kinds at the level of populations of experiences, not at the level of individual experiences, which are inevitably idiosyncratic. Other classi¢cations of subjective conscious experiences of memory are undoubtedly possible and may even prove more useful, in the longer run, than this one. But they will have to retain these two essential features. And the ultimate fate, theoretically, of any such classi¢cation, including this one, will depend more on the convergence of three major sources of evidenceöbehaviour, mind and brainöthan on any one or even any two such sources of evidence considered in isolation.
